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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

to set up drilling equipment, these cases seem ample to allow mineral exploration underneath highways.
A. ROGER KRINGLIE
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A corporate defendant, under authority of a lease granted by the fee-simple
owner of coal situated beneath a 16 acre tract of land had, after virtual
exhaustion of the coal therein, abandoned further mining but continued to
use the passageways created by such mining operations for the transportation
of coal mined beneath adjacent tracts. The joint owners of the surface of the
16 acre tract sought to enjoin further use of the passageways beneath their
land. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, in affirming the trial
court's dismissal of the complaint, held, when the corporate defendant leased
the coal in the 16 acre tract from the fee-simple owner thereof, under the
provision of a lease giving it that authority, it had the right to transport
through the subterranean passageways coal mined from adjoining lands so
long as the coal underlying the 16 acre tract was not exhausted or abandoned
and the mining operations were conducted with due diligence. Fisher v. West
Virginia Coal and Transport Company, 73 S.E.2d 633 (W. Va. 1952).
Because the decision is definitive of the law governing the subterranean
mining of coal alone it has little present or apparent value as an aid to interpretation of North Dakota law. It is interesting, however, to note the case as
illustrative of the sanctity which jurists sometimes accord to much-cited or
"leading" cases without adequate assurance of identity in fact situations or
sufficient inquiry to the validity of the reasoning which shaped the prior
decision.
Almost the entire body of law which has developed in delineation of this
issue is traceable to the Lillibridge case,1 decided in 1891 by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania. That decision held, under facts similar to those of
the instant case, that the mine operator could not be restrained from using
the subterranean passages to transport coal from the adjoining tracts even
though the coal in the adjoining tracts was acquired subsequent to the acquisition of the coal beneath the surface of the land owner by the complainants.It should be noted, however, that in the Lillibridge case the mine operator
was using passageways cut through the seam of coal which was the subject
of his grant, and the court there did nothing more than apply the familiar
rule that the owner may use property in any manner he chooses so long as
he does not injure another a The West Virginia Court in the instant case, like
the great majority of courts which cite the Lillibridge case as authority, failed
to distinguish this fact and preserved the right of the grantee of coal to use
the passageways for the removal of coal from adjoining tracts even though
mining operations have been suspended save for a "few pillars" 4 used for
subjacent support. In this way the grantee might extend his rights in the
1.
2.
3.
(1925).
4.

Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 143 Pa. 293, 22 Ati. 1035 (1891).
Cf. Westerman v. Pennsylvania Salt Mfg. Co., 260 Pa. 140, 103 Atl. 539 (1918).
Robinson v. Wheeling Steel and Iron Co., 99 W.Va. 435, 129 S.E. 311, 312
Armstrong v. Maryland Coal Co., 67 W.Va. 589, 69 S.E. 195, 203 (1910).
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haulway indefinitely by leaving a small amount of coal unmined until the
coal from the adjoining tracts could be removed.
The apparently harsh effect of the Lillibridge case has been somewhat mitigated, however, by a tendency to apply the rule of that case subject to an
important limitation imposed by a subsequent decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Webber v. Vogel. " That case demonstrates that, though
the Lillibridge decision declares the fee-simple owner of the coal owns both
the coal and the space created therein by his mining operations, his estate
has no badge of perpetuity. In nearly every case, the instrument conveying
the ownership of the coal discloses an intention of the parties that the coal will
be mined, and the subject of the grant, therefore, will soon be exhausted.
The Lillibridge case must therefore be applied only where it is shown that the
mine operator is mining the coal in good faith. The owner of the land above
and below has a right to the reversion of the space occupied by the coal within
a time contemplated by the parties when they sever that peculiar part of the
land from its horizontal adjoinders. It should be added that judicial opinion
is unanimous that abandonment of the mine or exhaustion of the coal effects
a reverter of the space to the grantor by operation of law.6
In applying the Lillibridge case, the court, though acknowledging the "good
faith" limitations of the Webber case, stated that the test of good faith is
satisfied by a showing of due diligence in mining operations as evidenced by
the application of modern and approved mining practices. A review of the
cases, however, leads to a strong inference that "modem and approved practices" are those which received judicial blessing in their inception as an aid
to the development of an important industry. Particularly is this true of the
practice which encourages the use of but one shaft as an entryway to coal
situated beneath the lands of several surface owners. This is precisely the
situation in the instant case and it may be fairly asked whether the surface
owner should be shackled to a perpetual state of anxiety, without compensation,
by permitting the grantee of the coal underlying his tract to progressively
extend his underground workings and therefore perpetuate a burden upon
the surface owner which was not contemplated in the execution of the original
conveyance. It is difficult to conceive such a situation satisfying the requirement of good faith. Recognition must, of course, be given to what could be
compelling economic necessity, and it is not suggested here that an injunction
should issue immediately upon showing of abandonment or exhaustion, particularly where the mine operator has erected expensive surface installations
which may, and perhaps should, be used in the exploitation of the coal undeilying adjoining lands. It would appear that a more satisfactory solution
would be to deny the injunction and affix a reasonable rental to be paid the
surface owner for the use of the space which he owns in reversion.
The only jurisdiction which has not followed the rule of the Lillibridge case
is Virginia. 7 The Supreme Court of that state pointed out the difficulty of
reconciling two opposing propositions embraced in the Lillibridge decision. The
Pennsylvania court proceeded to their decision on the assumption that the
grantee of coal in place received a corporeal interest in the walls containing
5. 189 Pa. 156, 42 Atl. 4 (1899).
6. Moore v. Indial Camp Coal Co., 75 Ohio 493, 80 N.E. 6,7 (1907).
7. Clayborn v. Camilla Red Ash Coal Co., 128 Va. 283, 105 S.E. 117 (1921);
ct. Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 185 Va. 534, 39 S.E.2d 231 (1946); Yukon Pocohontas Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 181 Va. 195, 24 S.E.2d 559 (1943).
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the coal as well as in the coal itself, yet recognized as indisputable that upon
exhaustion of the coal the space would revert to the grantor. If, as contended,
the conveyance of the coal carries with it the containing chamber, why
should the ownership of the space terminate as soon as all the coal is mined?
The rational view would be that the reverter takes place because the grantee
has never at any time had a corporeal estate in the containing walls. The conveyance carries an estate in the coal only, with an easement in the walls for
support and removal. s In the exercise of that easement the grantee has no
right to put an additional burden upon the servient estate by using it for
mining of coal in adjoining tracts. The easement is incidental to the grant
of a fee in the coal, and exhaustion, or abandonment in fact, of the coal terminates the easement, and the space reverts to the grantor. 9 This appears to
be the most justifiable opinion, although, as pointed out, distinctly in the
minority. An application of this rule combined with a requirement that the
grantee of the coal be permitted to maintain his surface installations and use
them along with the underground haulways upon the payment of a reasonable
rental would appear to satisfy both the pecuniary interests of the parties and
the public interest in protecting a basic and vital industry.
NORBERT AUER

TORTS - INTERFERENCE WITH OR INJURIES IN PERSONAL RELATIONS MALICIOUS INDUCEMENT OF BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE. - Plaintiff
brought action against defendants, her fiance's brothers and sisters, alleging
that through the use of false, malicious, and slanderous statements, not specifically set forth in the complaint, they induced her fiance to break his engagement with her. The suit was dismissed by the Circuit Court of Cook
County, and on appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, it was held, that the
judgment of the lower court dismissing the action should be affirmed. In
the absence of slanderous or libelous words, no cause of action will lie against
a third person for procuring a breach of a contract to marry, regardless of
malicious intent.' The mere allegation that slanderous statements were made,
without setting forth the nature of the statements, is a conclusion of law, and is
insufficient to state a cause of action for slander. Brown v. Glickstein, 107
N.E.2d 267 (I11.
1952).
The decision seems quite sound on the basis of public policy. Though it is
well-settled that third parties who wrongfully induce the breach of an ordinary civil contract will incur liability, the contract for marriage is a distinct
8.
9.

Clayborn v. Camilla Red Ash Coal Co., 128 Va. 283, 105 S.E. 117, 119 (1921).
Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, 25 AtI. 597, 599 (1893).

1. 2 Cooley, Torts §176 42 (4th ed. 1932). "The prevention of a marriage by the
interference of a third person, cannot, in general, in itself, be a legal wrong. Thus if one,
by solicitations, or by the arts of ridicule or otherwise, shall induce one to break off an
existing contract of marriage, no action will lie for it, no matter how contemptible and
blamable may be the conduct. But a loss of marriage may be such a special injury as will
support an action of slander or libel, where the party was induced to break off the
engagement by false and damaging charges not actionable per se." Davis v. Gardiner,
4 Coke 16, 76 Eng. Rep. 897 (1693);. Nelson v. Staff, Cro. Jac. 422, 79 Eng. Rep. 360

(1617); Southold v. Daunston, Cro. Car. 269, 79 Eng. Rep. 834 (1632); Shepherd v.
Wakeman, 1 Sid. 80, 82 Eng. Rep. 982 (1662); Parkins v. Scott, 1 H. & C. 153, 158
Eng. Rep. 839 (1862).

